






DO JEWS, CHRISTIANS, AND MUSLIMS 




When the first Muslim minister in Germany, Aygül Özkan, was sworn in in the 
Parliament of Lower Saxony on 26 April 2010, she used the formula: “So help 
me God.” Did this mean she was referring to the same God as her Christian 
colleagues who used the same words during that same ceremony? Ökzan’s re-
sponse to this question was, “As a practising Muslim, I refer explicitly to the 
one and only God who is common to the three monotheistic religions.”1 The 
spokesman for the regional church of Hannover, Johannes Neukirch, on the 
other hand, stated to the newspaper BILD that it was “a very unspecific image 
of God” if one claimed that all three monotheistic religions worshipped the 
same God: “We Christians certainly see a clear difference between our God 
and Allah.”2 The evidence he provided was the difference in the understanding 
of Jesus in the three religions. The president of the head office of the Evan-
gelical Church in Germany (EKD), Hermann Barth, voiced another opinion. 
There were certainly considerable differences in the image of God and the un-
derstanding of Jesus Christ, but the reference to God in the wording of the oath 
was not limited to the Christian understanding of God alone, he told the EPD 
(Protestant Press Service). The same applied to the mention of God in the pre-
amble to the German constitution (see note 2). 
 
The former moderator of the EKD Council, Wolfgang Huber, had already an-
swered this question a number of years earlier in an interview with the German 
weekly news magazine Focus on 22.11.2004: “We have to leave it to God to 
decide if God is the same God. As human beings, we can only judge the way 
God is confessed. We as Christians have no grounds for saying that we confess 
the same God as the Muslims.”3 I should like to start from this statement in my 
                                                 
1  http://www.neue-presse.de/Nachrichten/Politik/Niedersachsen/Ayguel-Oezkan-
vereidigt-So-wahr-ihr-Gott-helfe (accessed 29 January 2011). 
2  See http://www.evangelisch.de/themen/religion/kirchen-ohne-klare-haltung-zu-
oezkans-amtseid16629 (accessed 29 January 2011). 
3  http://wap.ekd.de/print.php?file=/aktuell/041122_huber_islam_focus-interview. 
html (accessed 29 January 2011). 
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search for an answer to the question if Jews, Christians and Muslims believe in 
the same God. Huber made three statements on this. First, the question if it is 
the same God in whom Christians and Muslims believe cannot be answered. 
Second, we have to distinguish between the reality of God and the confession 
of God, between God in his very being and believers’ grasp of this reality. 
Third, the ways of confessing God are fundamentally different, however, in 
these three religions. So there are no grounds for saying that Christians confess 
the same God as Muslims.  
The Viewpoint 
When Huber claims there is a difference between the Christian and the Muslim 
belief in God, he is not only stating the quite obvious fact that Christians do 
not confess Allah as the God who revealed the Qur’an and that their under-
standing of God differs from that of Muslims. Huber does not merely want to 
state factual differences from the quasi-neutral viewpoint of an observer. He is 
speaking as a theologian and expressing a theological judgement: he denies the 
theological assumption that the God whom Christians confess is “the same 
God” whom Muslims confess. That is more than the description of a fact of re-
ligious phenomenology; it is a theological prescription.  
 
In the reflections by Udo Tworuschka, a specialist in comparative religion at 
Jena, on the question, “Does everyone believe in the same God?” these two ap-
proaches are clearly contrasted (Tworuschka 2005). Comparative religion is 
not concerned with the reality of God but with the expressions of belief in God, 
namely, religion. From the point of view of the history and phenomenology of 
religion, there is an infinite variety of names for and images of God. In her 
Guide to the Gods, Marjorie Leach lists more than 20,000 deities (Leach 1992). 
Each one is connected with a different conception of the deity’s reality and ac-
tivity. In the history of religion strategies have been and are presented 
repeatedly for transcending this variety to identify a final, divine reality. Thus, 
for example, Celsus, the opponent of Christianity in the late classical period, is 
supposed to have said, “In my opinion, it makes no difference whether one 
calls Zeus the highest or Zen or Adonaios or Sabaoth or Amun, like the Egyp-
tians, or Papaios like the Scythians.”4 
 
Tworuschka views the assumption that Jews, Christians, and Muslims believe 
in the same God in the light of such identification strategies. His judgement is:  
Comparative religion … cannot answer the question whether the various gods can be 
projected onto one and the same God—and which one would that be?—or are only dif-
ferent names for one, single reality. Scholars of comparative religion feel profoundly 
uneasy about this anaemic, imaginary, average god. (Tworuschka 2005: 39f) 
                                                 
4 Celsus, Alethes Logos 5,41ª, quoted in Lona 2005: 300. 
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If references to the “one” or “same” God are to be understood in that way, this 
would indeed amount to a “very unspecific image of God,” such as Neukirch 
lamented. The meta-god constructed in this way is a mere postulate of reli-
gious reason—precisely the anaemic, imaginary, average god whom Two-
ruschka finds so repulsive, a god of the lowest common denominator obtained 
via abstraction from all the concrete features ascribed to him by the religions. 
That is certainly not the God on whom “Christians can set their hearts” (“an 
den Christen ihr Herz hängen können”) to use a formulation often quoted from 
the EKD publication Klarheit und gute Nachbarschaft (Clarity and Good 
Neighbourliness). But it is also not the God to whom Muslims are devoted or 
who is a present reality for the Jews in their narratives. In short, this way of 
talking about a common reference to God must be ruled out. Over against the 
Enlightenment’s religion of reason, Schleiermacher objected that religion 
exists only in the religions and not above them. The same applies by analogy 
to the relationship with God. 
 
Tworuschka’s article takes an exciting turn at the end—and this expresses the 
other approach. 
Many years ago, when my eldest daughter Mirjam asked me if our God and the God of 
my highly esteemed Islamic colleague and friend … Abdoldjavad Falaturi ... was the 
same, I answered the question with a clear “Yes” without any reservations or loophole 
(“Hintertür”). But that was a religious answer, not an answer from comparative religion. 
(Tworuschka 2005: 40) 
Thus, Tworuschka distinguishes between the two viewpoints mentioned above: 
the “neutral” viewpoint of an observer (3rd person perspective) and the com-
mitted, participatory viewpoint of someone who is involved (1st person per-
spective). The answers he gives from the one viewpoint or the other are in 
tension with each other, but they are not mutually exclusive. With this insight 
in mind, we come back to Huber, who spoke from the “religious” viewpoint. 
God and Divine Mediators 
What is the theo-logic that leads Huber to state that there are no theological 
grounds for assuming that Muslims and Christians pray to the same God? The 
basic idea can probably be summarised as follows. God has identified himself 
in Christ once for all in a normative and definitive way; he has bound himself 
to the Christ event and to the name of Jesus Christ. Therefore God’s nature— 
the nature of unconditional grace—can thus be seen only if one starts with 
Christ. And, therefore, one can also only confess God as he revealed himself in 
Jesus Christ. There can be no God without the divine mediator; the mediator 
determines the image of God. But the mediation of God through Jesus Christ is 
different from the mediation of God through the Qur’an, and Christians believe 
in the God mediated by Christ. 
 
This basic idea was also expressed by the present moderator of the EKD 
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Council, Nikolaus Schneider, in a television debate with the Islamic woman 
theologian, Hamideh Mohagheghi, after Aygül Özkan was sworn in as a minis-
ter.5 The Christian image of God is fundamentally determined by Jesus Christ, 
he said. It shows us a God who is not far removed from human suffering, who 
himself suffers and undergoes the experience of death and accomplishes re-
demption in precisely that way. Schneider’s partner in the debate replied that 
that was not the image of God in Islam. Suffering contradicts God’s good crea-
tion, and God helps human beings overcome it. The conception of a compas-
sionate God or a God who even suffers himself is profoundly alien to Islam 
and repulsive to Muslims. The merciful God would never allow his messenger 
to die like that. 
 
Despite all the common features that can be found between the “God of the 
Qur’an” and the “God of Jesus Christ,” the conceptions of God are fundamen-
tally different. In this respect, one is reminded of experiences in the context of 
Christian ecumenism. The elements that the confessions have in common re-
late to different frameworks of reference. And therefore even what they have in 
common is perceived in different ways. 
 
But, both in this discussion and in ecumenism, it can be stated that believing in 
God in different ways is not at all the same as believing in different Gods. 
Might it not be that not only the religions’ ways of believing but even the re-
velations on which they are based point beyond themselves because they make 
a distinction between themselves and the reality of God that transcends them? 
Then the God “above the God of theism” (Tillich 1982: 138), of whom Tillich 
spoke, would not be an anaemic abstraction but the God whom the Bible says 
dwells in unapproachable light (1 Timothy 6:16). He would be the God to 
whom Jesus Christ points, proclaims, and embodied. And he would also be the 
God to whom the Qur’an refers. He would be the God whom Nicholas of Cusa 
said is supra opposita, beyond all contradiction, the God whom Anselm of 
Canterbury argued is greater than anything that can be conceived. 
 
The heart of Anselm’s argument for the existence of God is precisely that a dis-
tinction must be made between the reality of God on the one hand and con-
ceptions, images, ideas, and confessions of God on the other. The argument 
runs: if one conceives of God, one must conceive of him as the reality that 
goes beyond all conceptions of God, as the real reality that can only be under-
stood as the limit of all thought. It is not possible to grasp this reality within 
the horizon of thinking because one would then need to conceive of something 
more comprehensive. It is the all-encompassing horizon that is always reced-
ing. We can know it is there, but we cannot grasp it.  
                                                 
5 http://www.zdf.de/ZDFmediathek/beitrag/video/1038174/ 




The revelations of the religions do not speak about God but from within God. 
They understand their disclosure not as solving a riddle, which would then 
make God’s truth plain for all to see, but as God’s mystery opening itself up 
while remaining a mystery even where it is revealed. It is revealed as a mys-
tery. This is particularly emphasised by the Christian theology of the cross, 
namely, that God’s hiddenness does not lie behind but dwells in his revelation. 
 
I will mention only three examples from the Islamic and Jewish-Christian tra-
dition in which one can perceive the distinction made between the revelation 
and the revealer. The Qur’an states: “Though the sea became ink for the Words 
of my Lord, verily the sea would be used up before the Words of my Lord 
were exhausted” (18:109; cf. 31:27). Here the Qur’an is relativised as an 
“earthly” book in reference to the transcendent word of the “heavenly” Qur’an 
as the “mother of the scriptures” (43:4), and, finally, in reference to the subject 
of the revelation, God. In the Torah it is reported that Moses, the mediator of 
revelation, was not allowed to see God’s face. For him, too, God remains an 
unfathomable mystery. The Johannine Christ, who is already portrayed as par-
ticipating in the glory of God, also clearly distinguishes himself from God as 
the mediator of this glory: “the Father is greater than I” (John 14:28). The di-
vinity of Jesus Christ resides not least in his not wanting to be like God. As the 
divine mediator, he can say, “The Father and I are one” (John 10:30). 
 
This applies all the more to the understanding of God. To distinguish between 
our religious understanding of the divine reality and this reality itself is a cri-
terion of authentic faith. We always “see” God only in the mode of a particular 
divine disclosure, in our case: in the revelation in Christ. But precisely in this 
disclosure one can also “see” that the reality of God is more comprehensive 
than the disclosure. Thus, to recognise that the reality of God goes beyond all 
the disclosures of that reality does not mean that we abandon the Jewish, 
Christian, or Muslim faith or adopt a supposedly higher standpoint above all 
faiths. These revelations themselves teach this: even in the fundamental dis-
closures of God in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, we encounter the aware-
ness that God’s reality is not restricted to these disclosures, however authen-
tically and reliably they may witness to it. To exaggerate a bit: the revelations 
relativise themselves in relation to God. This in no way abolishes their truth 
but, on the contrary, really expresses it as a derived truth—a truth derived from 
the truth of God that goes beyond them. God speaks through them. 
 
So, we have to be more specific about the initial question: Do Jews, Christians 
and Muslims believe in the same God? Their beliefs about God undoubtedly 
differ, but the reality of God to which those beliefs relate could be the same—
as an “ultimate point of reference” (Gordon Kaufman). This is similar to what 
is related in the well-known Buddhist story of blind people feeling separate 
parts of an elephant’s body and receiving quite different impressions of the ele-
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phant’s appearance. The images differ, but they all point to the same reality of 
the elephant that lies beyond them. 
 
An indication of this kind of reference can also be found in the words of Aygül 
Özkan. She said, “However different the dogmatic teachings may be that the 
individual religions have elaborated about God, it is still clear that they all re-
fer to one and the same God.”6  
Praising the Greatness of God 
We are unable to claim that Jewish, Christian and Muslim images of God refer 
to the same God. For that, we would need to have the perspective of an en-
lightened person at our disposal—as in the story of the elephant. But we have 
no access to that. According to Paul, we can only be assured of the reality of 
God through faith but cannot see it. Huber was quite right to say that we can-
not make any statements about the reality of God as such, at least no de-
scriptive statements.  
 
But believers in all ages have still found a language to put this incomprehensi-
ble, inexpressible reality into words; the language of doxology, the praise of 
God’s greatness that is beyond all words. Would it not be an expression of this 
praise if we were to say: this God is the one who encompasses everything, the 
history of the faith of Jews and Muslims, and of all other human beings to 
whom God is kindly disposed has its place in him? 
 
Again, it is a question of one’s viewpoint. If we look at it from the viewpoint 
of the human awareness of God and of religious conceptions of God, then we 
have to say “no” to the question if Jews, Christians and Muslims believe in the 
same God. But if, on the contrary, we start with God—and precisely with the 
God who made himself known in Jesus Christ—then we can perhaps give the 
positive answer that Tworuschka gave, without any reservations or loopholes, 
in praise for the greatness of God who has revealed himself as an inexhaustible 
mystery, just as human beings are “more” than all their self-revelations. The 
inviolable dignity of human beings also goes beyond their words and deeds. 
 
The emphasis on the greatness and universality of God certainly does not re-
duce or diminish the Christians’ dedication to Jesus Christ. In the intensity of 
his relationship with God, Jesus was God’s “son” who did not just transmit an 
image of God but led his disciples of all ages to God—as the way to the truth 
of life. The God who went with him into death and of whom one can since 
                                                 
6 http://www.bild.de/BILD/regional/hannover/aktuell/2010/04/28/erste-muslimis-
che-ministerin-in-deutschland-vereidigt/welchen-gott-meinten-sie-frau-ayguel-oezkan. 
html (accessed January 2011). 
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claim with certainty that he is still present, even in the darkest corner of human 
despair, is the God on whom not only Christians can set their hearts. This good 
news should not be kept from anyone. 
 
But we should also not forget that the theology of the suffering God, which is 
seen by Nikolaus Schneider and many others as the specific characteristic at 
the heart of the Christian understanding of God in contrast to Islam, has only 
been highly esteemed in the past few decades. “Theology after Auschwitz,” 
Dorothee Sölle, and Jürgen Moltmann have brought it into the foreground. It is 
based on Luther’s Christology with its communicatio idiomatum doctrine and, 
for Moltmann, it results from an interpretation of the Trinity in close connec-
tion with a theology of the cross. It is more or less unfamiliar to other Christian 
confessions. For example, it has little to do with Calvin’s theology of the glory 
of God. To claim that it demonstrates the main characteristic of the Christian 
understanding of God is a short-sighted view of the history of theology and a 
narrow approach to the variety of Christian confessions. This does not in any 
way neglect the truth of Luther’s insight that God is not only the Deus semper 
maior but also the Deus semper minor. Nonetheless, we should keep in mind 
that this is not the Christian understanding of God. 
Reasons for Assuming It Could be the Same God 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all teach that there is only one God. And this 
God is the God of the whole cosmos who permeates the whole of history and 
thus also the history of religion with his spirit and in this way presents himself 
to the followers of all religions. If one accepts the biblical understanding ac-
cording to which God is not only a tribal God concerned about his people, i.e. 
Jews and Christians, but is at work in creation as a whole, has not left himself 
without witness to any person and is near to everyone in the spirit, then, in my 
view, there are certainly good grounds for assuming that the God to whom 
Christians pray in the name of Christ is none other than the God to whom Mus-
lims turn in submission. 
 
The main reason for this assumption resides in the universality and uncondi-
tionality of God’s will for salvation proclaimed and practised by Jesus that, 
according to 1 Timothy 2:4, “desires everyone to be saved and to come to the 
knowledge of the truth.” Is it then conceivable that God could have made his 
gracious concern dependent on a particular belief in God? That would contra-
dict the teaching and practice of Jesus. It would also contradict the Protestant 
doctrine of justification. After all, the latter states that we are accepted by God 
not on the basis of our faith but only through God’s grace, and that we grasp 
this in faith as the first gift of justification. If God had tied his salvation exclu-
sively to Christian belief in God, then this offer of salvation would not be uni-
versal. God’s relationship with human beings cannot be conditioned by and 
dependent on their conceptions of God. 
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Nor can the answer to the question of the sameness of God be dependent on 
human conceptions of God. If that were the case, I would have a different God 
from my fellow Christians who have another image of the Christian God, who 
believe, for example, in a God who allows the larger part of humankind to 
follow the broad path to the abyss of condemnation. That is a God in whom I 
cannot believe without any reservations or loopholes. The conceptions of God 
within one religion can be just as diverse as the conceptions of God between 
different religions. But here too, it must be stated that believing differently in 
God does not imply believing in a different God, and that is why I assume that 
even such fellow Christians believe in the same God as I do. 
 
The apostle Paul informs the non-Christian Athenians: “I went through the city 
and looked carefully at the objects of your worship. I found among them an 
altar with the inscription, ‘To an unknown god.’ What you therefore worship as 
unknown, this I proclaim to you” (Acts 17:23) The Athenian pagans revere the 
God whom Paul proclaims even though they understand God in a quite differ-
ent way. 
 
If the assumption that Christians and Muslims pray to the same God is rejected, 
then the question arises as to how the God to whom people pray in the mosque 
should be judged theologically. Is he God at all? Or is he a desert demon as 
Christian polemics have repeatedly claimed and still claim today? Is he an “idol 
like all other idols,” as Karl Barth put it (Barth 1938: 57), or a human projec-
tion? If he is God, is he then another God? Then we should be faced with vari-
ous gods—and that would violate the first commandment. Should one think in-
stead that the one and only God is being presented and revered in a wrong way? 
Or should one refrain from all of these “speculative” considerations?  
 
Is it possible, however, to refrain from such speculative reflections? Such con-
siderations result to some extent necessarily from Huber’s position and from 
the position of all those who cannot see any grounds for the assumption that 
Jews, Christians, and Muslims believe in the same God. These considerations 
are speculative only if they are taken out of the context of theological reflec-
tion and the practice of faith. In many practical acts, implicit answers to this 
question are presupposed. We can take the issue of a Christian-Muslim mar-
riage ceremony as an example. Whether the pastor is willing to get involved at 
all in such an adventure and how he/she defines his/her role during the cere-
mony and conducts the service depends not least on theological pre-decisions. 
Every practice is guided by “implicit axioms” (Dietrich Ritschl). If the pastor 
acts on the assumption that the Christian-Muslim couple addresses their prayer 
for blessing their marriage to the same God, he/she will choose different for-
mulations for conferring God’s blessing and for the prayers than if he/she as-
sumes that the Muslim partner will receive the blessing not through but despite 
his/her faith. Every practice includes a preconception (Vorverständnis). In or-
der to develop theologically reflected forms of pastoral practice, this precon-
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ception needs to be discussed and subjected to clarification. This clarification 
cannot be obtained by means of unequivocal judgements but rather by search-
ing for arguments, namely for the grounds which Huber claimed do not exist. 
 
Huber was speaking only about Christians and Muslims but not about the Jews. 
If we include the Jewish understanding of God in our examination, it becomes 
even more difficult, in my view, to accept his judgement. This is so because, if 
one argues that God identified himself in Jesus Christ and that there is 
therefore no reason to assume that Muslims believe in the same God, then this 
judgement must also apply to post-biblical Judaism. The God who revealed 
himself according to the tradition in the Jewish Holy Scriptures, the Tanakh, 
the Talmud, and the Midrash did not disclose his identity in Jesus Christ. If we 
take Judaism’s self-understanding seriously, we must then logically state that 
there are no grounds for assuming that Jews believe in the same God. 
 
One could put this idea more pointedly and provocatively and ask if we really 
believe in the same God in whom Jesus believed. The more strongly one em-
phasises that Jesus was, after all, not a Christian but a Jew, the more pressing 
this question becomes. For this same reason, it also became pressing for Adolf 
von Harnack and for Marcion who forced the church into a major debate with 
his hypothesis that the Jewish scriptures proclaim an “alien God” (cf. Von 
Harnack 1996). In this debate, the church decided in favour of an unequivocal 
answer. It is not just an equivalent or similar God but the same God. 
 
Just as it is an essential part of the Christian understanding of God that God 
has revealed himself in Jesus Christ as the God of unconditional grace, it is 
equally impossible to state that the “pre-Christian” God of Israel who revealed 
himself on Sinai and the “post-Christian” God confessed by post-biblical Juda-
ism and whose characteristics are also different from the “Christian” God is a 
different God from the one whom Jesus Christ called “Father.” 
What Do the Others Say? 
According to the New Testament tradition, Jesus led people into a renewed re-
lationship with God, based not on observance but on trusting devotion, but he 
venerated no other God than the God of his Jewish ancestors. The Muslims 
confess this God even though they deviate from the image of God in the Chris-
tian tradition in many respects, including central ones. The Qur’an gives a 
clear answer to the question if Jews, Muslims, and Christians revere the same 
God. According to Surah 29:46, Mohammed assumes that “our” God is the 
same as the God of the Jews and Christians. And Jews, likewise, as a rule (to 
which there are exceptions) do not raise the question if Christians and Muslims 
pray to the same God. In Dabru emet, the “Jewish statement on Christians and 
Christianity” issued in the year 2000, the result of the “National Jewish Schol-
ars Project” in the USA and was signed by 220 scholars, it is stated that “Jews 
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and Christians worship the same God”, because “Christians also worship the 
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, creator of heaven and earth” (point 9). And 
the Roman Catholic Church during and since the Second Vatican Council has 
also explicitly recognised the sameness of God as the addressee of both Chris-
tian and Islamic worship and has included the Muslims in God’s universal will 
for salvation: “The plan of salvation also includes those who acknowledge the 
Creator. In the first place amongst these there are the Mohammedans, who, 
professing to hold the faith of Abraham, along with us adore the one and mer-
ciful God, who on the last day will judge mankind” (Lumen Gentium 16). In 
his address on the occasion of his encounter with Muslim youth in Casablanca 
on 19 August 1985, Pope John Paul II stated, “We believe in the same God, the 
one God, the living God, the God who created the world and brings his 
creatures to their perfection” (cf. CIBEDO 2009: Text 2200). 
 
It is obvious that all these statements presuppose that one can believe in the 
same God even when God is understood and worshipped in different ways. 
There are profound and, in part, insurmountable differences between the faith 
traditions. But one cannot conclude from these differences between the reli-
gions in their conceptions of faith that there is a difference in the divine foun-
dation to which they relate, and Huber does not assume so either. One can only 
look for reasons that undergird the one assumption or the other. 
Sensus Fidei 
I believe there are good reasons for assuming that Jews, Christians, and Mus-
lims believe in the same God, even if they believe in him differently. The first 
reason is based on the Jewish-Christian-Muslim basic confession of the one-
ness of God, the second reason is the understanding of God as the reality en-
compassing all reality, and the third reason is the assurance of God’s universal 
will for salvation. A fourth reason could be deduced from the consideration of 
the consequences that a denial of this assumption would have—theologically 
in relation to the three reasons just mentioned but also practically in relation to 
the way in which interreligious encounters would be conducted. 
 
Naturally, our concern cannot be to adapt theology to the ideal of interreligious 
understanding. On the other hand, interreligious encounter can become a con-
text for discovering knowledge of God7. There is a kind of theological sensitiv-
ity that develops in practice. Perhaps we can use the scholastic term sensus fi-
dei or fidelium (in an extended and figurative sense) to describe this sensitivity. 
Heinrich Ott once put it in the following way. 
                                                 
7 I have tried to provide some theological reflections on the relation between the 
Christian faith and non-Christian religions. See Bernhardt 2007. 
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In the encounter with and attentive study of another religion, we are sometimes sud-
denly overcome by a feeling of proximity. Is not that which people experience in the 
other faith close to what I experience in my faith? It is not something identical, not 
agreement, not even something comparable or related that we come across here (be-
cause what standpoint is there for a comparison?). It is merely “proximity”—or “neigh-
bourhood,” a term that Martin Heidegger sometimes used and described as Gegen-ein-
ander-über (opposite and facing one another), like referring to neighbouring farms, for 
example, which cannot be defined appropriately by any spatial parameter. (Ott 1991: 
41). 
Navid Kermani gave a very good example of this feeling of proximity when, 
as a Muslim—with all his objections to the Christian theology of the cross—he 
said after having viewed Guido Reni’s picture of the crucifixion in the Church 
of San Lorenzo in Lucina in Rome. “[I] found the sight so impressive, so full 
of blessing, that I did not want to stand up again. I thought for the first time 
that I—and not just someone—could believe in a cross.” 
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